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Abstract: The aim of this article is to assess whether a Fiscal Sustainability Indicator 
(FSI) can be used to predict the probability that a currency crisis occurs. The FSI 
developed by Croce and Juan-Ramón (2003) is employed. Two different definitions for 
currency crises are used to evaluate whether they induce different results in the analysis. 
In general, the results suggest that the lagged FSI has an explanatory power over currency 
crises in some countries. 
Key words: Currency crises, foreign exchange, fiscal sustainability, probit model. 
JEL Classification: F31, F33, E62 
 
Introduction 
The fiscal and monetary roots of currency crises have been studied both theoretically and 
empirically. The first generation models, called speculative attack models, focus on the 
role of inconsistencies between fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies (Krugman, 
1979, 1996; Flood and Garber, 1984; Flood and Marion, 1996). In these models, 
inadequate macroeconomic policy is the main cause of speculative attack against the local 
currency which finally leads to a currency crisis. The second generation models 
accentuate the self-fulfilling characteristics of a currency crisis and the occurrence of 
multiple equilibriums (Obstfeld, 1986, 1996; Rangvid, 2001). These models emphasize 
the role of policymakers` preferences. The option of abandoning a fixed exchange rate 
regime, in order to implement an expansionary monetary and fiscal policy, may be an ex-
ante optimal decision for the policymaker, considering that economic authorities face 
tradeoffs. However, a speculative attack becomes more likely because of the possible 
existence of multiple equilibriums. Finally, third generation models stress the 
consequences of moral hazards in the banking system and the contagion effect as key 
determinants of a speculative attack and currency crisis. Central Banks financing the 
rescue of the financial system could be inconsistent with a managed exchange rate regime 
(Chang and Velasco, 2001).  
More recent empirical research not only focuses on explaining the causes of a currency 
crisis, it is mainly motivated by the need to forecast and prevent currency crises and 
considers a wide range of variables that can help in constructing a system for predicting 
a currency crisis. Numerous studies have attempted to identify those variables that can be 
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the best predictors of currency crises. Literature on early warning systems (EWS) 
attempts to combine a number of indicators into a single measure of crises risks. Two 
approaches in constructing EWS models became common in early empirical works: the 
non-parametric signalling approach (Kaminsky et al., 1998; among others) and limited 
dependent variable probit-logit models (Berg and Pattillo, 1999a,b; Goldstein et al., 2000; 
Kumar et al., 2003; among others). Kaminsky et al. (1998) construct an early warning 
system using a signal model approach. The idea behind this model is that the indicators 
behave differently on the verge of a crisis. Therefore, when an observation exceeds a 
specific threshold, the indicator sends a signal. The more indicators flag signals, the 
higher the probability of a crisis. Alternatively, Berg and Pattillo (1999a,b) modify the 
probit model used in Frankel and Rose (1996) and associate a set of variables with the 
probability of a currency crisis. This approach provides the possibility of evaluating a 
formal model of relationships between various indicators and a discrete occurrence of a 
currency crisis. On the other hand, Crepo-Cuaresma and Slacik (2009) incorporate 
uncertainty in the framework of a binary choice model. They use real exchange rate 
misalignment and financial market indicators to predict crisis periods instead of a crisis 
occurrence. Similarly, Comelli (2013) compare performances of three parametric and 
non-parametric early warning systems for currency crises in emerging market economies 
using a set of explanatory macroeconomic indicators and an indicator of political risk. 
But the challenge has been to find an early warning indicator that allows for anticipation 
of these crises. Some authors use exchange rate expectations, currency overvaluation, and 
capital controls, among others, as predictors of currency crises (Goldfajn and Valdés, 
1998; Burkart and Coudert, 2002). Other researchers use stock market, sovereign ratings, 
the term structure of relative interest rate, level of international reserves and exchange 
rate overvaluation as leading indicators of currency crises (Broome and Morley, 2004; 
Sy, 2004; Crepo-Cuaresma and Slacik, 2007; Frankel and Saravelos, 2012). Some of the 
aforementioned studies employ more than one methodology. However, none of these 
consider a Fiscal Sustainability Indicator (FSI).  
The aim of this article is to assess whether a FSI can be used as a leading indicator in 
predicting currency crises. To measure the fiscal sustainability of each country considered, 
the alternative approach proposed by Croce and Juan-Ramón (2003) is employed. A 
probit model is then employed, and two empirical definitions for currency crises are used 
to evaluate whether they induce different results. 
Quarterly data for a sample of the following 17 countries is presented: Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Czech Republic, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, 
Honduras, Hungary, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, Thailand and 
Turkey. This is a heterogeneous group of countries. However, most of them have 
experienced episodes of currency crises or speculative attacks in the period 1990-2004. 
Therefore, the countries and the period considered provide a good sample to test our 
hypothesis. This selection of countries has been dictated by data availability. Fiscal policy 
was also a relevant criterion in terms of public debt as well as in terms of composition 
and variability of public expenditures in the sample. It should be emphasised that this 
paper does not attempt to give a detailed overview of the causes and unfolding of currency 
crises. Instead, it concentrates primarily on figuring out if the FSI helps to predict 
currency crises. 
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The remainder of this article is organised as follows: Section II discusses the FSI and 
presents a framework for the probit model. Section III shows the data and descriptive 
statistics. Section IV presents the empirical results. Finally, Section V shows some 
concluding remarks. 
Methodology 
Firstly, in this section, the recursive algorithm developed by Croce and Juan-Ramón 
(2003) is reviewed in detail. Government intertemporal budget constraint is the starting 
point. In order to facilitate the analysis, it is assumed that net privatisation proceeds, 
public revenue from the creation of money (seigniorage) and revaluations of assets and 
liabilities are equal to zero. The financing needs of the public sector are defined as: 
 1 1t t t t t tPSBR D D PD i D      (1), 
where tD  is the stock of total public debt (domestic and foreign), tPD  is the primary 
deficit and ti is the nominal rate of interest payments. Equation (1) shows that the change 
in the stock of public debt (domestic and foreign) is induced by the public sector 
borrowing requirement (PSBR) at time t to finance the primary deficit and the interest 
payments on public debt. Multiplying both sides of equation (1) by -1, the following is 
obtained: 
 1 1t t t t tPS i D D D     (2), 
where t tPS PD  , that is tPS is the primary surplus of the public sector. Equation (2) 
can be expressed as a fraction of the nominal Gross Domestic Product as: 
1t t t td d ps    (3), 
in which td is public debt as a proportion of GDP (the law of motion in the debt to GDP 
ratio), tps  is the ratio of the primary surplus to GDP, and 
1
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,  tr  is the real 
interest rate and tg  denotes the rate of growth of real output. Equation (3) states that, in 
the absence of shocks and corrective policies, public debt as a proportion of GDP  td  
increases over time in the presence of persistent primary fiscal deficits in conjunction 
with a real interest rate higher than the growth rate of real GDP. 
Intertemporal budget constraints for the public sector can be constructed from equation 
(3). For simplicity, it is assumed that t N    that is, the discount factor will be constant 
from time t  to time t N , and solving equation (3) forward recursively for  N  periods, 
we obtain: 
1 2
1 2
N N
t t t t N t Nd ps ps ps d   
   
         (4). 
This intertemporal budget constraint indicates that the initial stock of public debt should 
be equal to the discounted present value of the sequence of public primary surpluses from 
time t  to time t N . Using equation (4), the following definition can be stated: the public 
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sector is said to be solvent if the planned trajectory of the primary deficit, from time t  to 
time t N , satisfies the intertemporal budget constraint (equation 4). The definition 
stated above implies that 0t Nd   , that is, the public sector cannot be a net debtor in 
present value terms. This represents a strict condition for solvency, requiring the primary 
balance to become positive at some point. Alternatively, a less stringent condition for 
solvency can be derived by imposing weaker conditions on equation (4). We assume that 
*
t Nd d  , where 
*0 td d  . Thus, the present value of expected primary surplus ratios 
will reduce the debt ratio below the current level. To construct an indicator of fiscal 
sustainability, Croce and Hugo Juan-Ramón (2003) suggest the equation (3) and two 
additional equations: target variables and the government reaction function. First of all, 
target variables are defined as: 
 * * *1ps d   (5), 
where *ps  and *  are, respectively, the primary surplus ratio and the discount factor that 
would prevail once convergence to the target debt ratio  *d , is achieved. Secondly, the 
government reaction function is defined by: 
 * *1t t tps ps d d     (6), 
where the primary surplus ratio has two components: the primary surplus ratio associated 
with target debt ratio, and the policy response to the gap between the observed debt ratio 
and the target debt ratio. The parameter t  indicates the intensity of the policy response 
at time t , given the debt ratio gap in the previous period. Equation (6) characterises a 
fiscal rule or a policy reaction function. 
Combining equations (3), (5) and (6), the public debt as a proportion of GDP including 
the policy reaction parameter t  can be obtained: 
   * *1 1t t t t td d d         (7). 
In order to derive a simple expression for the index of fiscal sustainability, it is assumed 
that the debt ratio at time 1t   is higher than the long-term objective for that ratio  
 *1td d  . Hence equation (7) states that td  would converge to *d , if and only if  
1t t   . Therefore, we can use  t t   as an indicator of fiscal sustainability. An 
alternative expression for the fiscal sustainability indicator (FSI) is accordingly: 
 
*
*
1
1
1
t t
t t t
t t
r ps ps
FSI
g d d
 

  
    
  
 
(8). 
This expression states that a persistently higher spread between the observed real interest 
rate and the observed growth rate of real GDP would, other than being equal, lead to 
higher public indebtedness (high parameter t ). The second parameter  t  measures the 
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ratio between the deviations of the observed and target values of the primary surplus and 
public debt ratios. In addition, a fiscal position would be sustainable if  1tFSI  .  
Finally, a probit equation is then estimated to explain the probability that a currency crisis 
occurs  1tCrisis  : 
   0 1Prob 1t tCrisis F X     (9), 
where the dependent variable is a dummy that equals 1 if the economy is experiencing a 
currency crisis and zero otherwise, F  is the normal cumulative distribution function, and
X is a set of macroeconomic indicators, which are believed to be relevant in anticipating 
currency crises according to the literature. The choice of the explanatory variables is 
inspired by the literature on early warning systems. The explanatory variables are the 
fiscal sustainability indicator (FSI), real GDP growth (ΔGDP), the growth rate in the stock 
of foreign exchange reserves (ΔRI), the ratio between domestic money stock expressed 
in U.S. dollars and the stock of reserves (M2/RI), and the misalignment of the real 
exchange rate from its trend (RERDV). As a measure of trend of the real exchange rate, 
this paper uses a moving average of the last five years. The fiscal sustainability indicator 
is supposed to capture the state of fiscal fundamentals. Then, an unsustainable fiscal 
position would be expected to increase the risk of a devaluation or speculative attack. The 
real GDP growth and the growth rate in the stock of foreign exchange reserves should be 
negatively related to the crisis incidence. Higher economic growth should reduce the 
temptation to devaluate. Similarly, the ratio between domestic money stock expressed in 
U.S. dollars and foreign exchange reserves should be negatively related with currency 
crises because an unstable ratio may indicate a lending boom, which can be consistent 
with the expectation of currency depreciation. Delays of the real exchange rate, relative 
to its average over the previous five years, are considered to be associated with 
unsustainable external positions and, therefore, are expected to increase the probability 
of a devaluation or speculative attack on the currency. 
Two different definitions for currency crises are used to construct the binary crisis 
variable or the dependent variable. The first one defines a crisis as a nominal devaluation 
or depreciation of the domestic currency (ERD) that is greater than 6% in any given 
quarter, following the definition proposed by Frankel and Rose (1996) that there are only 
successful speculative attacks. The second definition for currency crises is the measure 
of exchange rate pressure or market pressure index (MPI) developed by Girton and Roper 
(1977) and modified by Eichengreen et al. (1996). This indicator is calculated by 
computing a weighted average of the nominal depreciation rate, the change in interest 
rates and international reserves using the United States as the country of reference. The 
advantage of using this index is that both successful and unsuccessful attacks on a 
currency can be asserted. According to this criterion, a given episode can be classified as 
a successful speculative attack or a crisis period if the value of the MPI is greater than 1.5 
standard deviations over the country's own mean value. Mean values and standard 
deviations are country-specific. The selection of the critical threshold of 1.5 times the 
standard deviation of the MPI from its mean captures mild crises (Aziz et al., 2000).  
However, a major drawback to this approach is that the weights, as well as the threshold 
value used to identify the speculative attacks, are somewhat arbitrary.  
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On the other hand, if the FSI uses all available information on fiscal stances (government 
budget deficit, the amount and composition of public debt, etc.), then it should help 
predict crises because fiscal indicators have some predictive power. Furthermore, the 
simple model should not be misspecified. That is, other fiscal variables proposed by the 
literature would already be captured by the FSI themselves. Thus, the state of fiscal 
fundamentals should be captured in this single indicator. 
Data and Summary Statistics 
The data is quarterly and covers the period from the first quarter of 1990 to the fourth 
quarter of 2004 for 17 countries3, which were selected following the data availability and 
because many of them experienced episodes of crises in the period studied. The data was 
collected from the World Bank's Global Development Finance (GDF), the IMF's 
Government Finance Statistics (GFS), the IMF's International Financial Statistics (IFS) 
and the respective Ministry of Finance websites. As the Czech Republic was founded in 
1993, earlier data for this country were not available. 
The summary of descriptive statistics for the dependent variables (market pressure index 
and the exchange rate depreciation) is listed in Table 1 and 2, respectively. According to 
Tables 1 and 2, Brazil, Peru and Turkey show the highest quarter averages of the MPI 
and depreciation in their exchange rates. Most of the countries considered displayed high 
degrees of volatility in their foreign exchange market, given that the standard deviations 
are always more than double their mean value. Nonetheless, Table 1 shows that Chile, 
Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador and Hungary have negative skewness 
(and only Chile in Table 2), which implies that more tranquil periods in which the 
exchange rates remain more or less stable tend to occur more often than large speculative 
attacks or depreciations in their foreign exchange markets.  
Empirical Results 
To construct a Fiscal Sustainability Indicator (FSI), we use 
*d  equal to the minimum 
value reached by the debt ratio during the period studied. The value of *  represents the 
median of the distribution for the observed values of   for the group of countries. 
Its value was set at 1.026, implying that the expected value of the real interest rate is 2.6 
percentage points higher than the real growth rate, in a steady state. Table 1 shows the 
countries with problems of fiscal sustainability during 1990Q1-2004Q4. Countries for 
which the FSI was above the threshold of 1 were classified as having been fiscally 
unsustainable  1    at least 75% of the times during the period studied. 
 
  
                                                          
3Argentina (ARG), Brazil (BRA), Chile (CHL), Colombia (COL), Costa Rica (CRI), the Czech 
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Thailand (THA) and Turkey (TUR). 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Market Pressure Index 
Country Mean
 
Median
 
Maximum Minimum 
Standard 
Deviations 
Skewness Kurtosis Observations 
Argentina 0.719 -1.856 131.121 -81.828 23.878 2.428 18.608 60 
Brazil 5.638 1.940 123.626 -78.875 23.404 1.442 14.359 60 
Chile -0.326 -0.151 6.366 -9.064 3.017 -0.332 2.997 60 
Colombia 0.320 0.025 7.878 -6.276 2.596 0.326 3.496 60 
Costa Rica 1.363 1.183 7.110 -5.701 1.939 -0.186 6.037 60 
Czech 
Republic 
-1.084 -1.055 11.492 -7.881 3.163 0.947 6.970 47 
Dominican 
Republic 
0.330 0.169 8.079 -8.431 3.063 -0.003 3.714 60 
El Salvador -0.245 -0.218 2.775 -3.556 0.916 -0.072 6.449 60 
Honduras 0.217 -0.117 4.017 -2.878 1.290 0.822 4.036 60 
Hungary 0.039 0.066 5.0602 -4.841 1.758 -0.144 4.626 60 
Indonesia -0.606 -0.950 13.789 -8.670 3.879 1.289 7.249 60 
Malaysia -0.127 -0.184 2.841 -3.706 0.902 0.159 8.909 60 
Mexico 0.056 -0.834 26.327 -13.777 5.181 2.426 13.745 60 
Peru -0.178 -0.410 59.533 -60.950 15.827 0.961 11.504 60 
Philippines 0.128 0.073 9.484 -5.994 3.330 0.452 3.346 60 
Thailand -0.561 -0.852 11.781 -7.433 2.786 1.485 8.615 60 
Turkey 3.381 2.708 35.815 -31.467 9.427 0.402 7.706 60 
All Countries 0.554 -0.116 131.122 -81.828 9.701 4.146 75.881 1007 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
Furthermore, Table 1 shows the frequency of   values being higher than * , and the 
frequency of   assuming a negative value (implying a primary deficit). According to the 
results showed in Table 3, on average, the countries in the sample present an 
unsustainable fiscal stance that is mostly explained by government fiscal deficits rather 
than by spreads between the real interest rates and the growth rates.  
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Table 2: Summary Statistics for Exchange Rate Depreciation 
Country Mean
 
Median
 
Maximum Minimum 
Standard 
Deviations 
Skewness Kurtosis Observations 
Argentina 7.583 0.000 195.147 -11.747 33.581 4.664 24.209 60 
Brazil 34.339 2.964 274.715 -14.700 60.368 1.977 6.688 60 
Chile 1.153 1.548 11.103 -9.879 4.257 -0.380 3.155 60 
Colombia 3.046 3.107 17.928 -10.525 5.552 0.340 3.638 60 
Costa Rica 2.878 2.517 11.492 -1.784 1.866 1.995 10.279 60 
Czech 
Republic 
-0.366 -0.757 20.063 -16.991 5.923 0.277 5.589 47 
Dominican 
Republic 
3.083 1.178 38.926 -30.896 9.271 1.173 10.362 60 
El Salvador 1.117 0.000 53.200 -4.798 6.972 7.125 53.694 60 
Honduras 6.951 1.337 310.000 -50.000 40.531 7.094 53.935 60 
Hungary 1.921 2.615 22.326 -11.627 5.425 0.321 5.424 60 
Indonesia 3.987 1.197 79.032 -28.187 17.684 2.592 12.167 60 
Malaysia 0.690 0.000 26.485 -8.851 5.244 3.285 15.764 60 
Mexico 2.758 0.904 56.433 -7.455 8.889 4.204 24.341 60 
Peru 29.157 1.651 1216.065 -3.731 158.675 7.172 53.986 60 
Philippines 1.709 0.241 28.384 -10.842 6.021 1.778 8.651 60 
Thailand 0.955 -0.197 41.617 -17.869 7.694 3.108 17.452 60 
Turkey 11.823 10.856 53.116 -17.200 12.313 0.948 5.823 60 
All Countries 6.725 1.152 1216.065 -50.000 44.725 20.687 537.112 1007 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
In summary, Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Czech Republic, El Salvador, 
Honduras, Hungary, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines and Turkey present large 
unsustainable fiscal positions in most of the period studied, which are basically explained 
by primary fiscal deficits. 
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Table 3: FSI Analysis 
 Frequency 
Country 1    *   0   
Argentina 87% 42% 95% 
Brazil 62% 42% 60% 
Chile 33% 3% 33% 
Colombia 93% 37% 100% 
Costa Rica 100% 2% 100% 
Czech Republic 95% 20% 84% 
Dominican Republic 40% 20% 40% 
El Salvador 97% 3% 100% 
Honduras 98% 13% 100% 
Hungary 95% 30% 97% 
Indonesia 50% 2% 60% 
Malaysia 47% 7% 77% 
Mexico 83% 18% 85% 
Peru 80% 42% 93% 
Philippines 98% 10% 100% 
Thailand 38% 13% 38% 
Turkey 100% 50% 100% 
All Countries 76% 21% 80% 
Note: Number of quarters as a percentage of total quarters.  
Source: Author’s calculations. 
A probit model estimation corrected for robust covariance is used to assess the 
effectiveness of the FSI. In order to avoid a spurious regression, unit root tests are 
performed on both the MPI and exchange rate, as to investigate whether these variables 
are stationary or not. The augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root test is used for this 
purpose. The results4 suggest that the variables are stationary. The Akaike criterion is 
used to select lags for the sample as a whole as well as for each individual country. The 
goodness-of-fit measures considered are McFadden R2 and the Hosmer-Lemeshow (H-L) 
test. In addition, two modified versions of McFadden's R2 as proposed by Estrella (1998) 
and Veal and Zimmerman (1992) are used. These measures compute a Log-Likelihood 
ratio of the model studied as compared to another model that does not take the information 
of the former into account. In the case of Estrella (1998), the Log-Likelihood of equation 
(9) is compared to the Log-Likelihood of a model where the binary series is only regressed 
on a constant (unconstrained model). Similarly, Veal and Zimmerman (1992) developed 
a pseudo-R2 measure of goodness-of-fit (V-Z R2) based on the ratio of the maximized 
                                                          
4 These regressions are not presented here, but are available upon request. 
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Log-Likelihood function versus the restricted Log-Likelihood function where 
explanatory variable coefficients except the intercept term are set equal to zero. The 
version proposed by Estrella (1998) further adjusts for the number of regressors. The 
results of these estimates are presented in Tables 4a, 4b, 5a and 5b.  
For the sample as a whole, the coefficient of the lagged FSI is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level, with a marginal effect of 8.7% for MPI. An interpretation of 
this marginal effect would proceed as follows; a 1% increase in the FSI will induce an 
8.7% increase in the probability that a currency crisis occurs. All the coefficient estimates 
are statistically significant, but only the misalignment of the real exchange rate from its 
trend has the expected sign. When ERD is used as the dependent variable, the coefficient 
of the FSI is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level with a marginal predictive 
contribution of 10.9%. Real GDP growth, the deviations of the real exchange rate from 
its trend and the growth rate in the stock of foreign exchange reserves have the right sign. 
However, the stock of foreign exchange reserves is not significant. The McFadden R2 for 
these estimates is 23.1% and 10.8%, respectively, while the results of the Estrella R2 are 
14.9% and 36.2%, respectively. The pseudo-R2 developed by Veal and Zimmerman (1992) 
shows that goodness-of-fit is 32.7% when MPI is used and 18.0% when the independent 
variable is ERD. In order to evaluate the goodness-of-fit in both models, the Hosmer-
Lemeshow (H-L) test is used. The H-L test statistics lead to not rejecting the null 
hypothesis of no difference between observed and predicted values. Also, the LR statistic 
shows the general statistical significance of the models (see Tables 4a and 5a). 
In fact, the estimated results for Argentina further suggest that a lagged FSI helps predict 
currency crises. Here, coefficients of FSI are statistically significant at the 1% level with 
a marginal predictive contribution of about 9.5%. Argentina shows an unsustainable fiscal 
position in 87% of the period studied (see Table 3). The rest of coefficient estimates are 
significant in explaining currency crisis and have the expected sign. Real GDP growth, 
the growth rate in the stock of foreign exchange reserves and the ratio between domestic 
money stock expressed in U.S. dollars and the stock of reserves are negatively related 
with the occurrence of a currency crisis. In the case of Brazil, the results indicate that the 
FSI has a significantly positive effect on the probability of crisis occurrence. Brazil shows 
an unsustainable fiscal stance in about 62% of the period considered. The rest of the 
variables are not significant except for the ratio between domestic money stock and the 
stock of reserves when ERD is used, but it is positively related with the probability of a 
crisis. The results for Chile show that the coefficient of FSI is statistically significant and 
negatively related with the crisis, but only when the MPI is used. Chile shows a 
sustainable fiscal stance in most of the period considered. Real GDP growths, the growth 
rate in the stock of foreign exchange reserves and the ratio M2/RI have the expected sign. 
The misalignment of the real exchange rate from its trend is significant and positively 
related with probability of currency crisis, but the marginal predictive contribution is very 
low. 
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Table 4a: Do FSIs Predict MPI? 
Variable
 
All 
 
ARG
 
BRA
 
CHL
 
COL
 
CRI
 
CZE DOM SLV 
Constant -3.226* 
(0.311) 
[-0.408] 
-3.443^ 
(1.876) 
[-0.136] 
-1.213 
(1.164) 
[-0.411] 
10.413 
(6.989) 
[0.258] 
-15.236* 
(4.287) 
[-0.908] 
-15.874* 
(6.204) 
[-0.642] 
-6.403 
(11.919) 
[-0.245] 
-17.843* 
(7.103) 
[-0.655] 
-12.869* 
(4.772) 
[-0.397] 
IFS(-1) 
   
-4.349^ 
(2.385) 
[-0.108] 
 
2.012 
(1.240) 
[0.081] 
 
3.475 
(3.510) 
[0.128] 
1.829* 
(1.081) 
[0.056] 
IFS(-2) 
      
-7.404^ 
(4.315) 
[-0.283] 
  
IFS(-3) 0.685* 
(0.173) 
[0.087] 
   
8.107* 
(2.204) 
[0.483] 
    
IFS(-4) 
 
2.407* 
(0.799) 
[0.095] 
1.191^ 
(0.674) 
[0.403] 
      
ΔPIB 0.004^ 
(0.002) 
[0.001] 
 
0.002 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
-0.448^ 
(0.257) 
[-0.011] 
     
ΔPIB(-1) 
    
0.102* 
(0.044) 
[0.006] 
 
0.364 
(0.417) 
[0.014] 
-0.333 
(0.214) 
[-0.012] 
 
ΔPIB(-2) 
 
-0.685* 
(0.231) 
[-0.027] 
   
1.184# 
(0.573) 
[0.048] 
   
ΔPIB(-3) 
        
1.105* 
(0.479) 
[0.034] 
ΔRI 
  
-0.002 
(0.004) 
[-0.001] 
-0.015 
(0.014) 
[-0.000] 
-0.095^ 
(0.054) 
[-0.006] 
-0.073# 
(0.035) 
[-0.003] 
   
ΔRI(-1) 0.002^ 
(0.001) 
[0.000] 
      
0.012^ 
(0.007) 
[0.000] 
0.052* 
(0.021) 
[0.002] 
ΔRI(-2) 
 
-0.0339* 
(0.013) 
[-0.001] 
       
M2/RI 0.248* 
(0.038) 
[0.031] 
 
-0.079 
(0.147) 
[-0.027] 
-4.081^ 
(2.294) 
[-0.101] 
-1.372* 
(0.606) 
[-0.082] 
1.500^ 
(0.809) 
[0.061] 
 
1.652^ 
(0.889) 
[0.061] 
 
M2/RI(-1) 
      
1.915 
(2.815) 
[0.073] 
  
M2/RI(-2) 
 
-1.177^ 
(0.714) 
[-0.047] 
       
RERDV 0.024* 
(0.006) 
[0.003] 
 
0.010 
(0.012) 
[0.003] 
 
0.294* 
(0.084) 
[0.018] 
0.384^ 
(0.384) 
[0.016] 
   
RERDV(-1) 
   
0.116# 
(0.054) 
[0.003] 
  
-0.852 
(0.786) 
[-0.033] 
  
RERDV(-2) 
       
-0.184 
(0.122) 
[-0.007] 
 
Prob LR 0.000 0.003 0.018 0.539 0.005 0.009 0.477 0.008 0.333 
McFadden R2 
Estrella R2 
V-Z R2 
0.231 
0.149 
0.327 
0.659 
0.362 
0.733 
0.144 
0.194 
0.287 
0.401 
0.084 
0.440 
0.566 
0.346 
0.663 
0.643 
0.343 
0.717 
0.371 
0.099 
0.419 
0.665 
0.359 
0.736 
0.338 
0.070 
0.375 
H-L Test  
χ2 
13.280 
0.103 
2.748 
0.949 
3.776 
0.877 
0.281 
1.000 
3.208 
0.921 
1.578 
0.991 
0.267 
1.000 
0.209 
1.000 
0.379 
1.000 
Note: Estimates are provided for each individual country. The dependent variable is a dummy 
variable which takes on a value of 1 if there is a currency crisis in the quarter. Standard errors and 
marginal effects are displayed in the parentheses and brackets, whilst *, #, and ^ represent 
significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Table 4b: Do FSIs Predict MPI? 
Variable
 
HND HUN IDN MYS MEX PER PHL THA
 
TUR
 
Constant -35.308* 
(7.652) 
[-3.642] 
-0.136 
(1.340) 
[-0.013] 
-7.644* 
(1.728) 
[-0.223] 
-42.800* 
(10.255) 
[-1.289] 
4.535# 
(2.172) 
[0.130] 
-2.301* 
(0.335) 
[-0.047] 
-15.509# 
(7.144) 
[-0.599] 
-12.414* 
(4.285) 
[-0.767] 
-12.671* 
(2.395) 
[-0.446] 
IFS(-1) 
  
1.491^ 
(0.891) 
[0.044] 
   
15.316# 
(6.010) 
[0.592] 
-2.523* 
(0.718) 
[-0.156] 
 
IFS(-2) 
 
-7.311* 
(2.769) 
[-0.294] 
  
-11.655* 
(2.567) 
[-0.335] 
-0.314^ 
(0.183) 
[-0.006] 
   
IFS(-3) 7.169* 
(1.737) 
[0.739] 
        
IFS(-4) 
   
2.860 
(2.005) 
[0.086] 
    
0.779^ 
(0.423) 
[0.027] 
ΔPIB 
  
0.069# 
(0.035) 
[0.002] 
  
-0.348# 
(0.164) 
[-0.007] 
   
ΔPIB(-1) 
 
-0.145^ 
(0.008) 
[-0.006] 
 
0.827* 
(0.271) 
[0.025] 
-1.688* 
(0.480) 
[-0.048] 
  
0.784* 
(0.241) 
[0.048] 
0.932* 
(0.224) 
[0.033] 
ΔPIB(-2) 3.011* 
(0.674) 
[0.311] 
        
ΔPIB(-4) 
      
-0.895# 
(0.417) 
[-0.035] 
  
ΔRI 
  
-0.209# 
(0.082) 
[-0.006] 
      
ΔRI(-1) 
 
0.002 
(0.004) 
[0.000] 
  
-0.059* 
(0.018) 
[-0.002] 
 
-0.066# 
(0.032) 
[-0.003] 
-0.252* 
(0.072) 
[-0.016] 
-0.036^ 
(0.021) 
[-0.001] 
ΔRI(-2) 0.021* 
(0.008) 
[0.002] 
        
ΔRI(-4) 
   
0.0496* 
(0.0184) 
[0.002] 
     
M2/RI 
  
0.772* 
(0.296) 
[0.022] 
 
2.261* 
(0.706) 
[0.065] 
  
2.518# 
(1.113) 
[0.156] 
0.898* 
(0.317) 
[0.032] 
M2/RI(-1) 1.605* 
(0.326) 
[0.166] 
0.519* 
(0.184) 
[0.021] 
 
8.354* 
(1.925) 
[0.252] 
  
-2.049^ 
(1.057) 
[-0.079] 
  
RERDV 
 
-0.328^ 
(0.192) 
[-0.013] 
 
0.210* 
(0.059) 
[0.006] 
-0.084^ 
(0.049) 
[-0.002] 
    
RERDV(-1) 
      
0.219 
(0.137) 
[0.008] 
  
Prob LR 0.000 0.415 0.002 0.004 0.000 0.073 0.009 0.000 0.000 
McFadden R2 
Estrella R2 
V-Z R2 
0.828 
0.591 
0.879 
0.496 
0.112 
0.536 
0.727 
0.406 
0.789 
0.734 
0.425 
0.796 
0.777 
0.529 
0.839 
0.518 
0.120 
0.558 
0.655 
0.359 
0.729 
0.625 
0.434 
0.725 
0.742 
0.503 
0.814 
H-L Test 0.154 0.017 0.055 0.054 0.321 0.092 1.641 2.291 1.669 
χ2 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.990 0.971 0.989 
Note: Estimates are provided for each individual country. The dependent variable is a dummy 
variable which takes on a value of 1 if there is a currency crisis in the quarter. Standard errors and 
marginal effects are displayed in the parentheses and brackets, whilst *, #, and ^ represent 
significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Source: Author’s calculations. 
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That is, accordingly to the results showed in Tables 1 and 2. Chile has negative skewness, 
which implies that more stable periods in the foreign exchange market tend to occur more 
often than large speculative attacks or depreciations. For Colombia, the results indicate 
that an unsustainable fiscal position increases the probability of a crisis when MPI is 
employed. The coefficient of the FSI is positive and statistically significant at the 1% 
level, with a marginal effect of 48.3% for MPI. Colombia has consistently maintained an 
unsustainable fiscal position as a result of primary fiscal deficit and higher real interest 
rate-growth gap (Table 3). The probability of a crisis tends to increase with real economic 
growth and the deviation of the exchange rate from its trend. However, accumulation of 
foreign exchange reserves and M2/RI ratio reduce the risk of currency attack. On the 
contrary, FSI is not significant when ERD is used and the rest of the variables are 
negatively related with crisis probability. 
Results for Costa Rica show that coefficients are statistically significant at the 10% level, 
with a marginal effect of 53.8%, but only if ERD is used. Costa Rica presents a high 
frequency of unsustainable fiscal position in the period considered. The real GDP growth, 
the ratio between domestic money stock and foreign exchange reserves and delays of the 
real exchange rate, relative to its average over the previous five years, are positively 
related with currency crises. While the growth rate in the stock of foreign exchange 
reserves is negatively related with crisis incidence if MPI is employed. Similar 
conclusions are drawn by Frankel and Saravelos (2012) and Comelli (2013). For the 
Czech Republic, the coefficients of the FSI have negative signs and are statistically 
significant, but only when MPI is used. When ERD is employed as the dependent variable, 
the coefficient of the FSI is negative, but statistically insignificant. The probability of a 
crisis tends to reduce with real GDP growth, accumulation of foreign exchange reserves 
and M2/RI ratio. The misalignment of the real exchange rate from its trend is statistically 
insignificant. 
For the Dominican Republic, the results suggest that the FSI predicts the probability of 
currency crises, but only when ERD is used. The marginal predictive contribution is 
82.1%. The Dominican Republic shows an unsustainable fiscal position in 40% of the 
period studied (Table 3). The accumulation of international reserves and misalignment of 
the real exchange rate from its trend have the signs as expected. When MPI is used as the 
dependent variable, the coefficient of the FSI has the expected sign, but it is not 
statistically significant (see Tables 4a and 5a). In the case of El Salvador, the results 
suggest that lagged FSI helps predict currency crises. The FSI calculated for El Salvador 
persistently presented an unsustainable fiscal stance (see Table 3). However, when ERD 
is employed as the dependent variable, the coefficient of the FSI has a negative sign and 
it is statistically significant. Real GDP growths and the growth rate in the stock of foreign 
exchange reserves are positively related with probability of currency crisis, but when 
ERD is used, the stock of foreign exchange reserves shows a negative relationship with 
crisis incidence. 
The estimated results for Honduras show that the coefficient of the FSI has a positive sign 
and is statistically significant at the 1% level, with a marginal effect of 73.9%, but when 
the MPI is used as an independent variable. Honduras persistently presents an 
unsustainable fiscal stance (see Table 3). Real GDP growth, the stock of foreign exchange 
reserves and the M2/RI are positively related with currency crisis occurrence independent 
of the crisis definition employed. For Hungary, the coefficient of the FSI has a negative 
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sign and is statistically significant, particularly when MPI is used. This country presents 
a high frequency of unsustainable fiscal positions (95%) in the period considered. The 
probability of a crisis tends to reduce with real GDP growth and the misalignment of the 
real exchange rate from its trend. In contrast, M2/RI ratio reduces the risk of currency 
attack with a marginal effect of 2.2%. Accumulation of foreign exchange reserves is not 
significant. If ERD is used, the FSI is not statistically significant, and the growth rate in 
the stock of international exchange reserves and delays of the real exchange rate have the 
right sign. In the case of Indonesia, the results indicate that the FSI has a positive effect 
on the probability of crisis occurrence, but the marginal effect is 4.4% when MPI is 
employed. According to Table 3, Indonesia shows a sustainable fiscal position in 50% of 
period studied. On the contrary, when ERD is used, the FSI has a significantly negative 
effect on the probability of currency crisis. Accumulation of international reserves has the 
expected sign, independent of which definition for currency crises is used, but it is not 
statistically significant when ERD is employed. The real GDP growth is positively related 
with probability of currency crises in both definitions of crisis. Similarly, for Malaysia, 
the coefficient of the FSI has a negative sign and is statistically significant when ERD is 
used. But it has a positive sign and is not statistically significant when MPI is employed. 
Malaysia shows a consistently sustainable fiscal balance in the period under study (Table 
3). If MPI is used, the rest of the coefficient estimates are statistically significant, but only 
the misalignment of the real exchange rate from its trend has the expected sign. 
Conversely, when ERD is used, only real economic growth and the growth rate in the 
stock of international reserves are statistically significant, but only the last variable has 
the expected sign (see Tables 4b and 5b). 
The results for Mexico present a negative FSI coefficient when MPI is used. However, 
when ERD is employed, the coefficient of the FSI is positive, but is not significant. In 
most of the years under study, the FSI for Mexico presents an unsustainable fiscal position 
(83% of the time). The probability of a currency crisis in Mexico tends to increase with 
M2/RI. In contrast, real GDP growth, accumulation of foreign exchange reserves and the 
misalignment of the real exchange rate reduce the risk of a currency attack when MPI is 
employed. By contrast, when ERD is used, the ratio between domestic money stock and 
the stock of international reserves increases the probability of a currency crisis. The 
remainder of the variables are not statistically significant. For Peru, the results suggest 
that the FSI predicts high probabilities of ERD. The fiscal sustainability indicator for Peru 
shows an unsustainable fiscal stance during most of the period considered. The M2/RI 
ratio is negatively related with probability of currency crises. But when MPI is used, the 
coefficient of the FSI is negative and statistically significant at the 10% level, and the real 
GDP growth has a negative sign. Similarly, the results for the Philippines show that the 
coefficients of the FSI are statistically significant with a high marginal predictive 
contribution. For the Philippines, the fiscal sustainability indicator exhibits an 
unsustainable fiscal position during 98% of the period considered (see Table 3).When 
MPI is employed, all the coefficient estimates are significant in explaining currency crisis 
and have the expected sign. Instead, when ERD is used, only the real GDP growth and 
the stock of foreign exchange reserves are statistically significant and have the expected 
sign (see Tables 4b and 5b).  
For Thailand, the results indicate that the FSI has a substantial effect on the probability 
of ERD, with a marginal effect of 36.2%. The fiscal sustainability indicator for Thailand 
indicated sustainability in the period considered. The real GDP growth and the ratio 
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between domestic money stock and international reserves are positively related with 
currency crises. The growth rate in the stock of foreign exchange reserves is negatively 
related with the crisis incidence but it is not statistically significant. However, when MPI 
is used, it is statistically significant and has the right sign. Likewise, in the case of Turkey, 
the high significance of the FSI coefficient and its high marginal effects suggest that the 
FSI predicts ERD. But the marginal effect is negligible when MPI is used. The fiscal 
sustainability indicator for Turkey shows an unsustainable fiscal position in the overall 
period studied (Table 3). The real economic growth and the M2/RI are statistically 
significant, and are positively related with the probability of currency crises when MPI is 
employed. The accumulation of international reserves reduces the probability of currency 
crisis. However, when ERD is used, only the coefficient of FSI is statistically significant. 
On the other hand, the LR statistic shows the general statistical significance of the models 
(zero hypothesis of no significance of most the coefficients in the models was rejected). 
The different pseudo-R2 indicates relatively good goodness-of-fit in the different models. 
However, in order to evaluate the goodness-of-fit in the different estimation the Hosmer-
Lemeshow (H-L) test is carried out. The null hypothesis is that fit is sufficient to the data. 
The H-L test statistics do not reject the null hypothesis, so it is reasonable to consider that 
the goodness-of-fit is quite acceptable. 
In summary, the estimated results suggest that, for some countries, the FSI is useful in 
predicting the probability of currency crises. Moreover, its overall explanatory power is 
quite substantial, given that the different pseudo-R2 measure surpassed the value of 20% 
for most specifications. 
Concluding Remarks 
This article addressed the issue of whether a fiscal sustainability indicator can anticipate 
the occurrence of currency crises. The results reveal that an unsustainable fiscal position 
positively affects the probability of currency crisis occurrence. In some countries, the 
results seldom vary when different definitions for currency crises are considered 
separately. In spite of these, our empirical findings seem to provide supporting evidence 
for some authors, who argue that fiscal policy plays an important role in generating 
currency crises.  
The sign of the coefficients of different macroeconomic variables used is not uniform for 
all countries. The results obtained in the different estimations appear to be in line with 
some of the empirical studies on currency crises. Large accumulation of international 
reserves has a negative incidence on probability of currency crisis. 
For future research, it would be interesting to apply the same analysis to a larger sample 
of countries and to a higher frequency of data, such as monthly data, as well as the 
refinement of the FSI to include behavioural content that would take into account 
endogenous private savings and investment behaviour, and thereby allow extensions to 
externally financed public deficits. On the other hand, one must investigate whether those 
fiscal imbalances in some countries reflect deeper structural shortcomings such as soft 
budget constraints and inefficient tax systems. 
  
  
 
191 
Table 5a: Do FSIs Predict ERD?  
Variable
 
All 
 
ARG
 
BRA
 
CHL
 
COL
 
CRI
 
CZE DOM SLV 
Constant -1.936* 
(0.268) 
[-0.394] 
-3.443^ 
(1.876) 
[-0.136] 
-4.432* 
(1.383) 
[-1.176] 
-1.569 
(3.269) 
[-0.185] 
0.533 
(1.006) 
[0.083] 
-2.520 
(3.716) 
[-0.250] 
3.916 
(4.933) 
[0.534] 
-10.781^ 
(5.843) 
[-0.963] 
-0.951 
(1.197) 
[-0.037] 
IFS(-1) 
  
2.096# 
(0.968) 
[0.556] 
1.672 
(1.442) 
[0.197] 
 
5.429^ 
(3.153) 
[0.538] 
 
9.187^ 
(5.382) 
[0.821] 
 
IFS(-2) 
      
-1.924 
(3.786 
[-0.262] 
  
IFS(-3) 
        
-1.577# 
(0.712) 
[-0.062] 
IFS(-4) 0.534* 
(0.163) 
[0.109] 
2.407* 
(0.799) 
[0.095] 
  
0.795 
(0.494) 
[0.125] 
    
ΔPIB -0.016# 
(0.008) 
[-0.003] 
 
-0.013 
(0.009) 
[-0.004] 
-0.174 
(0.123) 
[-0.020] 
-0.386# 
(0.153) 
[-0.061] 
    
ΔPIB(-1) 
       
0.087 
(0.080) 
[0.008] 
 
ΔPIB(-2) 
 
-0.685* 
(0.231) 
[-0.027] 
   
-0.168 
(0.110) 
[-0.017] 
-0.121# 
(0.054) 
[-0.016] 
  
ΔPIB(-3) 
        
0.207# 
(0.082) 
[0.008] 
ΔRI 
  
0.003 
(0.005) 
[0.001] 
0.009 
(0.019) 
[0.001] 
-0.013 
(0.018) 
[-0.002] 
-0.008 
(0.006) 
[-0.001] 
-0.077* 
(0.025) 
[-0.011] 
  
ΔRI(-1) -0.002 
(0.002) 
[-0.001] 
      
-0.034* 
(0.013) 
[-0.003] 
-0.025# 
(0.012) 
[-0.001] 
ΔRI(-2) 
 
-0.034* 
(0.013) 
[-0.001] 
       
M2/RI 0.084# 
(0.035) 
[0.017] 
 
0.326* 
(0.122) 
[0.086] 
-0.505 
(1.092) 
[-0.059] 
-1.165# 
(0.586) 
[-0.182] 
-0.648* 
(0.226) 
[-0.064] 
-1.609# 
(0.652) 
[-0.219] 
-0.167 
(0.158) 
[-0.015] 
 
M2/RI(-1) 
         
M2/RI(-2) 
 
-1.177^ 
(0.714) 
[-0.047] 
       
RERDV 0.023* 
(0.006) 
[0.005] 
 
0.008 
(0.012) 
[0.002] 
 
-0.027 
(0.026) 
[-0.004] 
0.061 
(0.063) 
[0.006] 
   
RERDV(-1) 
   
-0.011 
(0.034) 
[-0.001] 
  
-0.168 
(0.166) 
[-0.023] 
  
RERDV(-2) 
       
0.048# 
(0.021) 
[0.004] 
 
Prob LR 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.165 0.055 0.172 0.073 0.000 0.641 
McFadden R2 
Estrella R2 
V-Z R2 
0.108 
0.089 
0.180 
0.659 
0.362 
0.733 
0.314 
0.404 
0.521 
0.229 
0.140 
0.320 
0.256 
0.200 
0.377 
0.266 
0.144 
0.352 
0.329 
0.252 
0.459 
0.626 
0.572 
0.757 
0.167 
0.032 
0.191 
H-L Test 8.361 2.748 10.063 3.014 14.529 3.168 5.150 2.672 3.056 
χ2 0.399 0.949 0.261 0.934 0.069 0.923 0.742 0.953 0.931 
Note: Estimates are provided for each individual country. The dependent variable is a dummy 
variable which takes on a value of 1 if there is a currency crisis in the quarter. Standard errors and 
marginal effects are displayed in the parentheses and brackets, whilst *, #, and ^ represent 
significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Table 5b: Do FSIs Predict ERD? 
Variable
 
HND HUN IDN MYS MEX PER PHL THA
 
TUR
 
Constant 4.518 
(3.973) 
[1.163] 
-1.728# 
(0.706) 
[-0.434] 
4.080# 
(2.051) 
[0.717] 
-10.685# 
(4.824) 
[-0.470] 
-5.203# 
(2.352) 
[-0.910] 
-28.791# 
(11.922) 
[-0.947] 
-2.233# 
(0.939) 
[-0.513] 
-24.182* 
(7.181) 
[-1.615] 
-5.104* 
(1.364) 
[-0.876] 
IFS(-1) 
  
-1.736^ 
(0.921) 
[-0.305] 
 
1.506 
(1.154) 
[0.263] 
 
1.265^ 
(0.730) 
[0.291] 
5.412# 
(2.749) 
[0.362] 
4.762* 
(1.083) 
[0.817] 
IFS(-2) 
     
45.468# 
(19.766) 
[1.496] 
   
IFS(-3) 
   
-3.170# 
(1.561) 
[-0.139] 
     
IFS(-4) -7.979# 
(3.657) 
[-2.054] 
0.361 
(0.361) 
[0.091] 
       
ΔPIB 
    
-0.099 
(0.105) 
[-0.017] 
-0.203 
(0.221) 
[-0.007] 
   
ΔPIB(-1) 0.475* 
(0.178) 
[0.122] 
-0.013 
(0.011) 
[-0.003] 
0.051# 
(0.022) 
[0.009] 
   
-0.182^ 
(0.109) 
[-0.042] 
0.231# 
(0.107) 
[0.015] 
 
ΔPIB(-2) 
        
0.018 
(0.055) 
[0.003] 
ΔPIB(-3) 
   
1.050* 
(0.342) 
[0.046] 
     
ΔRI 
 
-0.035# 
(0.014) 
[-0.009] 
-0.016 
(0.017) 
[-0.003] 
-0.109* 
(0.035) 
[-0.005] 
0.005 
(0.006) 
[0.001] 
 
-0.016^ 
(0.009) 
[-0.004] 
  
ΔRI(-1) 
       
-0.041 
(0.033) 
[-0.003] 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
[-0.001] 
ΔRI(-2) 0.007# 
(0.003) 
[0.002] 
        
M2/RI 
  
-1.160* 
(0.370) 
[-0.204] 
0.191 
(1.269) 
[0.008] 
0.615* 
(0.213) 
[0.108] 
-20.826# 
(9.313) 
[-0.685] 
  
-0.519 
(0.322) 
[-0.089] 
M2/RI(-1) 0.375* 
(0.132) 
[0.097] 
0.964* 
(0.306) 
[0.242] 
    
0.142 
(0.117) 
[0.033] 
4.140* 
(1.467) 
[0.277] 
 
RERDV 
   
0.011 
(0.074) 
[0.001] 
  
0.016 
(0.023) 
[0.004] 
  
RERDV(-1) 
 
0.105# 
(0.047) 
[0.026] 
  
-0.025 
(0.016) 
[-0.004] 
    
Prob LR 0.000 0.031 0.000 0.016 0.085 0.000 0.059 0.000 0.000 
McFadden R2 
Estrella R2 
V-Z R2 
0.417 
0.358 
0.566 
0.234 
0.222 
0.372 
0.387 
0.403 
0.564 
0.591 
0.308 
0.671 
0.207 
0.168 
0.319 
0.862 
0.838 
0.923 
0.179 
0.180 
0.304 
0.566 
0.384 
0.673 
0.471 
0.527 
0.659 
H-L Test 1.647 3.402 6.046 0.574 6.976 24.997 7.342 0.568 3.195 
χ2 0.990 0.907 0.642 0.999 0.539 0.005 0.500 0.999 0.922 
Note: Estimates are provided for each individual country. The dependent variable is a dummy 
variable which takes on a value of 1 if there is a currency crisis in the quarter. Standard errors and 
marginal effects are displayed in the parentheses and brackets, whilst *, #, and ^ represent 
significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Source: Author’s calculations. 
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